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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
PAMELA PECK I 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
WILLIAM DUNN, et al, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case No. 15338 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
The appellant, Pamela Peck, sought relief in 
the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, on the ground that Title 16, 
Chapter 3, Section 28 of the Revised Ordinances of Salt 
Lake County is unconstitutional. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURI' 
The Third Judicial District Court in and for 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, denied appellant's Motions 
for Declaratory Judgment and Summary Judgment and, granted 
respondent's Motion to Dismiss on June 29, 1977, on the 
ground that Title 16, Chapter 3, Section 28 of the Revised 
Ordinance of Salt Lake County is constitutional and a 
Valid exercise of the powers of tbe Board of County 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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Commissioners of Salt Lake County. The Honorable Jay E. 
Banks, Judge, presided. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The appellant, Ms. Pamela Peck, was charged by 
a complaint on January 8, 1977, with the crime of cruelty 
to animals in violation of §16-3-28 of the Revised Ordinan 
of Salt Lake County, 19 6 6, as amended. Section 16-3-28 0, 
the Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake County (effective May 
5, 1976) entitled Cruelty Prohibited; subsection (h) Nuisa· 
to Keep Animals for Fighting states as follows: 
Any person, firm or corporation, who 
shall raise, keep or use any animal, fowl, 
or bird for the purpose of fighting or 
baiting; and any person who shall be a 
party to or be present as a spectator 
at any such fighting or baiting of any 
animal or fowl; and any person, firm or 
corporation who shall rent any building, 
shed, room, yard, ground or premises for 
the purposes aforesaid; or shall knowingly 
suffer or permit the use of his buildings, 
sheds, rooms, yards, grounds, or premises 
for the purposes aforesaid; and any person, 
firm or corporation who shall knowingly 
carry, haul, or deliver any animal, fowl 
or bird to be used for any of the purposes 
aforesaid, shall be guilty of a Class "B" 
Misdemeanor, and shall be subject to a 
fine in an amount not to exceed $229.00 
or imprisoned in the County Jail not to 
exceed six months, or both. 
The appellant was charged with a violation of only the 
clause of the above-mentioned ordinance which states "and 
any person who shall be a party to or be present as a 
spectator at any such fighting or baiting of any animal 
or fowl, .•• shall be guilty of a Class "B" Misdemeanor, 
-2-
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and shall be subject to a fine in an amount not to exceed 
$299.00 or imprisoned in the County Jail not to exceed six 
months, or both. " 
The appellant is a person whose rights, status, 
and/or other legal relations are affected by the above-
dsecr~bed ordinance within the meaning of Utah Code Ann., 
§78-33-2 (1953). 
On March 21, 1977, the appellant filed an Amended 
complaint naming the Board of County Commissioners as 
defendants. The Amended Complaint requested the Court 
to issue an Order and Judgment declaring said county or-
dinance to be unconstitutional. 
On April 13, 1977, the respondents moved to dismiss 
the complaint on the ground that said county ordinance is 
constitutional. The appellant's Motions for Summary Judgment 
and Declaratory Judgment were denied and respondent's Motion 
to Dismiss was granted on June 29, 1977, on the grounds 
that said ordinance is constitutional and a valid exercise 
of the Powers of the Board of County Commissioners, respondents 
herein. 
The record indicates that the appellant was present 
at a cockfight. There is no evidence in the record to 
indicate that Ms. Peck was present as a spectator, or that 
she intended to be present as a spectator or that she 
intended to commit an offense or that she intended that 
c;t_n,..,rs should conunit an offense. 
-3-
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In this appeal, the appellant is challengi~~ 
dismissal of her complaint in the lower court and the 
constitutionality of said county ordinance. 
-4-
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POINT I 
SALT LAKE COUNTY REVISED ORDINANCE 
16-3-28(h), 1966, AS AMENDED, IS SO 
VAGUE THAT MEN OF COMMON INTELLIGENCE 
MUST NECESSARILY GUESS AT ITS MEANING, 
AND DIFFER AS TO ITS APPLICATION AND 
HENCE IT VIOLATES THE FIRST ESSENTIAL 
OF DUE PROCESS OF LAW. 
ARGUMENT 
The appellant in the above-entitled action, Ms. 
Pamela Peck, was charged under Section 16-3-28(h) of the 
Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake County, 1966, as amended, 
which states: 
Any person, firm or corporation, 
who shall raise, keep or use any animal, 
fowl, or bird for the purpose of fighting 
or baiting; and any person who shall be 
a party to or be present as a spectator 
at any such fighting or baiting of any 
animal or fowl; and any person, firm or 
corporation who shall rent any building, 
shed, room, yard, ground, or premises 
for any such purposes as aforesaid; or 
shall knowingly suffer or permit the use 
of his buildings, sheds, rooms, yards, 
grounds, or premises for the purposes 
aforesaid; and any person, firm, or 
corporation who shall knowingly carry, 
haul, or deliver any animal, fowl, or 
bird to be used for any of the purposes 
aforesaid, shall be guilty of a Class 
"B" Misdemeanor, and shall be subject to 
a fine in an amount not to exceed $299.00 
or imprisoned in the County Jail not to 
exceed six months, or both. 
More specifically, the State charged that on or 
about January 8, 1977, Ms. Pamela Peck was unlawfully 
... present as a spectator at such fighting or baiting 
of a fm1l _ , _ Section 16-3-28(h) of the Salt Lake County 
-5-
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Revised Ordinances in pertinent part. 
The crux of the appellant's argument is that 
the portion of the ordinance with which she is charged i: 
unconstitutionally vague and overbroad inasmuch as it 
encompasses within its express language what may be 
essentially innocent conduct. 
In a recent case decided by the Supreme Court:. 
Hawaii the court held that an ordinance or statute pro-
scribing presence, whether at a cockfight, gambling game, 
or house of prostitution, is too vague to satisfy t~ 
requirements of due process. State v. Abe llano, 50 Hawa:. 
384, 441 P.2d 333 (1968). In Abellano, thirteen persons 
were arrested for violation of an ordinance which charge: 
that the defendants "did engage or participate in, or we1 
present at, a cockfight exhibition." Abellano, supra, a: 
334. The district court dismissed the complaint and the 
appellate court affirmed on the ground that the ordinance 
was vague and, hence, unconstitutional. A er iminal stat: 
is unconstitutional if it is not 
... sufficiently explicit to inform 
those who are subject to it what conduct 
on their part will render them liable to 
its penalties***. And a statute which 
either forbids or requires the doing of 
an act in terms so vague that men of 
common intelligence must necessarily 
guess at its meaning and differ as to 
its application, violates the first 
essential of due process of law. 
Abellano, supra, at 334 quoting from 
Connally v. General Const., Co., 269 
u. s. 385, 391 (1926). 
-6-
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In particular, the Abellano court was concerned 
wJth the proscription of "presence." 
An ordinance or statute proscribing 
presence, whether at a cockfight, a 
gambling game, or a house of prostitution, 
is too vague to satisfy the requirements 
of due process. Primarily, the term 
presence has a spacio-physical frame of 
reference. Unless the activity at which 
presence is unlawful is in a narrowly 
confined place, determination of what 
constitutes presence at the activity can 
be resolved only on the basis of policy. 
Setting such policy is a legislative 
function. The legislative body has 
failed to make clear its policy deter-
mination. For this court to attempt to 
rewrite the ordinance to cure the 
constitutional defect would be an 
unconstitutional exercise of legislative 
power. Abellano, supra, at 334. 
The facts of the Abellano case closely parallel 
the facts of the case at bar. The appellant herein was 
charged with being present at a cockfight. The term 
presence is nowhere defined in the ordinance. Inasmuch 
as the respondents have failed to clarify said term, the 
ordinance suffers from a constitutional defect, that is, 
the indefiniteness of the term presence fails to inform 
with sufficient explicitness what conduct will render 
an individual criminally liable. 
The Nebraska Supreme Court recently laid down 
guidelines to assist in determining whether a statute 
defining an offense is void for uncertainty. The rule is: 
-7-
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( 1) Whether the language may apply 
not only to a particular act about which 
there can be little or no difference of 
opinion, but equally to other acts about 
which there ma~ be radical differences, 
thereby devolving on the court the exercise 
of arbitrary power of discriminating 
between the several classes of acts, and 
(2) the dividing line between what is law-
ful and what is unlawful cannot be left 
to conjecture." Adkins, supra at 658, 
quoting from State v. Ruback, 135 Neb. 355 
281 N.W. 607,~(1938). I 
In Adkins, the defendants were charged with a 
violation of the Controlled Substance Act. The district 
court affirmed the ruling of the county court which had 
dismissed the actions on grounds that the section of 
the Act under which defendants were charged was uncon-
sti tutionally vague and over broad on its fact. The Suprei:; 
Court affirmed. The Nebraska Statute provided as follows: 
(1) It shall be unlawful for any 
person:***(g) To visit or be in any room, 
dwelling, house, vehicle, or place where 
any controlled substance is being used 
contrary to the provisions of .•. , if the 
person has knowledge that such activity 
is occurring;*** Adkins, supra at 655. 
* * * 
Under the express terms of said 
section only three things are necessary 
to constitute a crime. A person need 
only (1) be in a place, (2) where a 
violation of the Controlled Substances 
Act is being committed, and (3) with 
knowledge that such activity is 
occurring. It is evident that the 
statute as written is broad enough to 
encompass entirely innocent behavior. 
Individuals may find themselves in 
situations such as at parties, theaters, 
dance halls, hotel lobbies, buses, 
-8-
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apartments, taxis, or even in private 
automobiles, where their conduct has 
no relation to the acts of others who 
may be disposed to use controlled drugs. 
Adkins, supra at 657. 
The court held that the above-mentioned portion 
of the Controlled Substances Act violated the two-pronged 
test; the court would have to arbitrarily distinquish 
lawful acts from unlawful acts inasmuch as the statutory 
language embraced not only acts commonly recognized as 
reprehensible, but also others which it was unreasonable 
to presume were intended to be made criminal. 
It is apparent that the county ordinance here 
under attack suffers the same infirmities as did the Nebraska 
Controlled Substances Act. The ordinance is so vague that 
the court must decide not only if the accused is guilty 
of the proscribed conduct, but must first determine what 
conduct is actually proscribed, thus devolving to the court 
the dity to discriminate between what is lawful and what 
is unlawful. Applying the Nebraska test, the county ordinance 
should be declared unconstitutionally vague. 
The factual situations in both Abellano, supra, 
and Adkins, supra, closely parallel the facts in the case 
at bar. The defendants in all three cases were charged 
with committing the offense of "presence at the scene of 
a crime." The courts in Abellano and Adkins found the 
statutes unconstitutionally vague in contravention of the 
Due P~ocess and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth 
-9-
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Amendment to the United States Cons ti tut ion. The appelk 
submits that the lower court's order should be reversed,. 
the action against her dismissed. 
-10-
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POINT II 
THE COUNTY ORDINANCE WHICH PUNISHES 
MERE PRESENCE AT A COCKFIGHT FAILS 
TO REQUIRE A CULPABLE MENTAL STATE. 
ARGUMENT 
To be convicted of conunitting any public offense, 
the State must prove that the accused evinced the requisite 
criminal intent to conunit said offense. State v. McKinnon, 
556 P.2d 906 (1976). 
This court has long adhered to the 
principle that more than mere presence at 
the scene of a crime is necessary to establish 
criminal intent. McKinnon, supra, at 909. 
See also State v. Mccomas, 85 Mont. 428, 
278 P.993"""('I9'29). 
Mere knowledge or physical presence at the scene of a 
crime neither constitutes a crime nor supports a charge 
of aiding and abetting a crime. State v. J-R Distributors, 
Inc., 82 Wash. 2d 584, 512 P.2d 1049 (1973). In J-R 
Distributors, the defendants were convicted of the sale 
and exhibition of obscene materials, and for aiding and 
abetting in such sales. On appeal, the case against one 
defendant was dismissed because the evidence was insufficient 
to show aiding and abetting. 
To find one guilty as a principal 
on the ground that he was an aider and 
abetter, it must be proven that he shared 
in the criminal intent of the principal 
.... aiding and abetting ... assumes some 
participation in the criminal act in 
furtherance of the common design .••• J-R 
Distributors, supra, at 1055. 
-11-
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In other words, the word "abet" includes (1) 
knowledge of the perpetrator's wrongful purpose, and (2) 
encouragement, promotion or counsel of another in the 
commission of the criminal offense. The defendant in 
J-R Distributing, supra, wrapped pornographic magazines 
in cellophane. His knowledge of the store owner's wrongfu: 
purpose was insufficient to sustain a charge of aiding 
because he did not share with the store owner an intent to 
sell any of the maga2ines. 
In a recent California case, the court stated 
that in order to hold an accused as an aider or abetter "t: 
test is whether the accused in any way, directly or 
indirectly, aided the perpetrator by acts or encouraged 
him by words or gestures." People v. Villa, 156 Cal. 
App. 2d 128, 318 P. 2d 828, 833 (1957). 
The County ordinance here under attack punishes 
mere presence at a cockfight. Caselaw holds that mere 
presence neither constitutes a crime nor supports a 
charge of aiding or abetting in the commission of a crime. 
Ms. Peck, the appellant herein, was charged with 
the crime of being present at a cockfight. The record doe; 
not evidence that she aided or abetted the principal eithe: 
through actions, gestures, or words. There is no evidence 
that she had knowledge of an unlawful purpose or that she 
. . · of the intended to commit a crime. Appellant's conviction 
crime of presence at a cockfight, without more, is 
-12- scf 
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insufficient to sustain a charge of criminal malfeasance. 
There is in existence a state statute which 
addresses the issue of criminal responsibility for the 
commission of an offense and it reads as follows: 
Every person acting with the mental 
state required for the commission of an 
offense who directly commits an offense, 
who solicits, requests, commands, encourages, 
or intentionally aids another person to 
engage in conduct which constitutes an 
offense shall be criminally liable as a 
party for such conduct. Utah Code Ann., 
§76-2-202, as amended in 1973. 
said statute explicitly requires a culpable mental state 
to commit or an affirmative action to induce an offense. 
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann., §17-5-35, 1953 as 
amended, and Article VI, §28 of the Constitution of Utah, 
County of Salt Lake is empowered to enact certain legislation 
unless it conflicts with state statutes. The County 
Ordinance under attack proscribes mere "presence" at the 
scene of a crime and does not require any showing of a 
culpable mental state. The State statute hereinabove 
cited specifies that absent a showing of a culpable mental 
state, an accused cannot be held criminally responsible 
for his actions. The ordinance is in direct conflict with 
the statute. The ordinance, therefore, has no force and 
effect and the appellant respectfully requests that this 
court declare Section 16-3-28 of the Revised Ordinances 
of Salt Lake County to be null, void and unenforceable 
,-:nrl in conflict with the general laws of the State of 
-13-
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Utah and beyond the scope of the power and authority of 
the Board of County Conunissioners for Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant submits that her charge be dismissed, 
Title 16, Chapter 3, Section 2 8 of the Revised Ordinances 
of Salt Lake County is unconstitutionally vague and over-
broad inasmuch as it encompasses within its express languac 
what may be essentially innocent conduct. The Supreme 
Court of Hawaii has recently decreed that an ordinance pro· 
scribing presence at a cockfight is too vague to satisfy 
the requirements of due process. Abellano, supra, Adkins, 
supra. 
The case at bar presents similar factual situatic 
as that found in Abellano. The term "presence" is so vague 
that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at 
its meaning and differ as to its application. The county 
ordinance is unconstitutionally vague and is thereby render, 
null and void. Adkins, supra. 
The ordinance fails to require a culpable mental 
state to be present as a spectator at a cockfight. As a 
'f' 
result, it embraces innocent conduct as well as reprehensi., 
The ordinance has no legal force or effect inasmuch as it 
conflicts with Utah Code Ann., §76-2-202, supra, which 
expressly states that absent a showing of intent, an accuse 
cannot be held criminally reponsible for his actions. 
-14- d 
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Appellant submits that the decision of the lower 
court be reversed and 
DATED this 
-15-
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